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When Zeno of Citium established the Stoa in Athens around 300 BC, one 
presumably could not establish a philosophy school without offering a course 
in rhetoric. Zeno is said to have divided the part of philosophy that concerns 
logos into two parts, namely dialectics and rhetoric.1 But even from our 
scanty evidence for early Stoicism, it is clear that the first Stoics were not 
very interested in rhetoric. In fact it seems that Zeno and his first successors 
were against rhetoric in the conventional sense, for reasons which I will return 
to later. This raises some big questions, in particular the question of how 
Zeno could encourage his students to engage in politics, as we know he did, 
for which rhetorical skills are crucial, at least in democratic poleis. I do not 
pretend to answer this question here. I just focus on one fact that I believe 
can shed some light on this question, namely that a course in Stoic rhetoric 
seems to have been a course in what we now call lobbying. That is, rhetoric 
in early Stoicism was not about learning to speak at large political meetings, 
but rather about learning to have conversations in smaller circles, much like 
the conversations Socrates had with leading figures in Athens. Thus, I will 
suggest that Stoic rhetoric is based on the sort of method that Socrates used. I 
will also suggest that the early Stoics used their fairly strange sort of rhetoric 
on the sort of questions to which the answers are more or less plausible, i.e. the 
sort of questions that Aristotle discussed in the Topics. What I am suggesting, 
in short, is that rhetoric in early Stoicism is related to Socratic elenchos and 
Aristotelian dialectics.
This means that rhetoric in early Stoicism was rhetoric for philosophers. 
Cicero, too, had a notion of what we may call philosophical rhetoric, but the 
Stoics and Cicero seem to have meant rather different things by this. Cicero’s 
main point, as far as I understand, is that orators need to acquire a degree 
of philosophical wisdom in order to really master their art.2 He also seems 
to be urging contemporary philosophers to engage in oratory, as he claims 
the ancients philosophers did, and to do so in order to gain some political 
influence, as he thinks they deserve to have. In any case, what the Stoics 
emphasized, by contrast, is that a wise man will engage in oratory and politics 
only in order to make other people more virtuous. Hence the philosophical 
rhetoric of the Stoics is not about using language in such a way that people are 
1 See Sextus Empiricus, Adversus	Mathematicos 2. 7 (= Long and Sedley 1987 31E). See also Diogenes 
Laertius, Vitae Philosophorum 7. 41 (= Long and Sedley 1987, 26B4).
2 See e.g. his De Oratore 1. 84.
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moved to make certain decisions, or in such a way that political ideals can be 
implemented; rather, it is about using language in such a way that people learn 
what they need to know in order to make well-informed decisions. These are 
strange ideas, no doubt, but I will try to make sense of it all in this article. That 
is to say, I will try to put together a jig-saw puzzle consisting of four pieces. 
First, I look at Cicero’s objections to Stoic rhetoric. Then I discuss the relation 
between rhetoric and dialectics in the philosophical system of the Stoics. I 
then try to reconstruct what a Stoic speech may have been like. Finally I return 
to the question of why the early Stoics were so critical of traditional rhetoric, 
as I have claimed they were.
Standard	objections	to	early	Stoic	rhetoric
Cicero’s critique is harsh:
[H]ow much less refined is the Stoic style when compared with the glittering prose [of 
the early Peripatetics and the Academics]! … This whole area was completely ignored by 
Zeno and his followers, whether through lack of ability or lack of inclination. Cleanthes 
wrote an ‘Art of Rhetoric’, and so did Chrysippus; these works are perfect reading for those 
whose burning ambition is to keep quiet. Look at how they proceed: coining new words and 
discarding the tried and tested ones. … You say that the audience will be inspired to believe 
[the Stoic doctrine that ‘the whole universe is our village’]. A Stoic inspire anyone? More 
likely to dampen the ardour of the keenest student. … The Stoics’ own pronouncements 
on the power of virtue are poor stuff indeed. Is this what they suppose will bring about 
happiness through its own intrinsic force? Their little interrogations have all the efficacy 
of pin-pricks. Even those who accept the conclusions are not converted in their hearts, and 
leave in the same state as when they came.3 (De	finibus 4. 5–7.)
Notice, in particular, that the Stoics, according to Cicero, used ‘little 
interrogations’ in their speeches. It seems that any kind of rhetorical question 
can be an interrogatio. In the language theory of the early Stoics, however, 
an erōtēma is defined as a specific sort of speech act and a specific sort of 
rhetorical question, namely the act of asking a yes-or-no question; it is probably 
this technical Stoic term that Cicero here translates as ‘interrogatio’. If this is 
right, Cicero is saying in the passage above that brief yes-or-no questions 
played a key role in Stoic rhetoric. He is also saying that these questions ‘have 
all the efficacy of pin-pricks’. This must be an ironic comment on Cicero’s 
part, for he regarded Stoic rhetoric as having no sting at all. So it was probably 
the early Stoics themselves who described their brief rhetorical questions as 
having the efficacy of pin-pricks. (It is possible that what the Stoics had in 
3 Trans. Woolf 2001.
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mind is the sort of effect that Socrates had on the people he came into contact 
with, i.e. paralyzing them with his poisonous sting.4 But as far as I know, 
this is not recorded.) Both the yes-or-no questions and the sting are found in 
another of Cicero’s comments on Stoic rhetoric:
Cato, in my view a perfect specimen of a Stoic, holds opinions that by no means meet with 
the acceptance of the multitude, and moreover belongs to a school of thought that does not 
aim at oratorical ornament at all or employs a copious mode of exposition, but proves its 
case by using little interrogations like pin-pricks.5 (Paradoxa Stoicorum 2.)
This passage is about Marcus Cato the younger, who according to Cicero is 
one of three ‘Stoic orators’ (the two others are Publius Rutilius and Gaius 
Fannius, both of whom were students of Panaetius, around 140–130 BC). Of 
these three, only Cato was any good, according to Cicero, and this was not 
because of his Stoic training but in spite of it. We should note that Cicero 
complains here that the Stoics do not aim for oratorical ornament and we 
should also note that he, in the passage I cited above, says that they invent new 
words and disregard the old ones. Thus, Cicero is also criticizing the Stoics for 
their rhetorical style, their lexis, dictio.
 From these two passages in Cicero, Stoic rhetoric comes across as 
terribly boring: a ‘Stoic speech’ is without elegance or wit. I can see no reason 
to believe that Cicero is lying. Yet we should balance what he says against 
two other facts. First, Cicero may have had strategic reasons for emphasizing 
the less attractive features of Stoic rhetoric, namely the fact that he regarded 
this theory as a competitor against his own theory of philosophical rhetoric. 
Secondly, we must not forget that the Stoics had achieved considerable 
political influence by Cicero’s time, which seems to presuppose that Stoic 
orators must have had some means of persuading people in political matters. 
Cicero gives no information about what these means might have been, but 
I will try to illustrate later how a ‘Stoic speech’ could be persuasive. First, 
however, we should try to clarify how the early Stoics conceived of rhetoric, 
i.e. where they placed it in their philosophical system.
4 See e.g. the Meno 80a–b.
5 Trans. Rackham 1942.
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How to use logos: dialectic and rhetoric in Stoic philosophy
We will gain some clarity about how the Stoics conceived of rhetoric and its 
place in philosophy if we look at two passages. The first is again from Cicero:
Torquatus [who defends Epicureanism] said, ‘An end to questioning, if you please. I told 
you my own preference right from the beginning, precisely because I foresaw this kind 
of dialectical quibbling.’ ‘So you prefer to debate in the rhetorical rather than dialectical 
style?’ I asked. ‘As if’, he replied, ‘continuous discourse is only for orators and not for 
philosophers!’ ‘Zeno the Stoic shared your view’, I said. ‘He declared, following Aristotle, 
that the art of speaking is divided into two categories. Rhetoric is like an open palm, because 
orators speak in an expansive style; dialectic is like a closed fist, since the dialectical style is 
more compressed. I bow, then, to your wishes, and will use, if I can, the rhetorical style, but 
it shall be the rhetoric of philosophers rather than lawyers.’6 (De Finibus 2. 17.)
Many issues are raised in this passage, but I want to focus on only two of 
them.7 First, Cicero implies that, according to the early Stoics, orators and 
philosophers are in agreement about the usefulness of continuous discourse. 
Secondly, he says expressly that Zeno compared rhetoric with an open palm, 
while dialectics is like a closed fist. We know that Zeno used a similar hand 
analogy also in his epistemology. But what does he mean here? In what sense 
is rhetoric like an open palm? Let us turn to the next text.
[According to the Stoics], rhetoric … is the science of speaking well in regard to continuous 
discourses (peri	tōn	en	diexodōi	logōn); and dialectic … is the science of correct discussion 
in regard to discourses conducted by question and answer (peri ton en erwtesei kai apokrisei 
logon); … [rhetoric] is divisible into invention, phraseology, arrangement, and delivery. 
A rhetorical discourse [is divisible into] introduction, narrative, replies to opponents and 
peroration. … There are five virtues of language (aretai logou) – correctness, clarity, 
conciseness, appropriateness, ornament. …. conciseness is a style that employs no more 
words than are necessary for setting forth the subject in hand …8 (Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 
Philosophorum 7. 42–3, 59)
As far as I can see, everything in this passage is quite conventional, except for 
two things. (1) There are many similarities between dialectics and rhetoric. 
Not only can both orators and philosophers make use of continuous discourse, 
6 Trans. Woolf 2001.
7 There is also the question of whether Cicero meant to say that the Stoic drew the distinction between 
rhetoric and dialectic in the same manner as Aristotle had done, which does not seem to be right. As far as I 
can see, what the Stoics call ‘the art of speaking’ consists of two parts: (i) the art of speaking in such a way 
as to give proofs, and (ii) the art of speaking in such a way as to reason from premises that are likely to be 
true, where the former belongs to dialectics and the latter belongs to rhetoric. In my reading of the passage 
above, then, Stoic rhetoric corresponds to Aristotelian dialectics.
8 Trans. Long and Sedley 1987.
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as we have just seen, but Stoic dialectics is said to make use of a question-
and-answer method, and we saw in the former section that rhetoric does, too. 
Note also that the five above-mentioned virtues of language seem to apply to 
both uses of language – argumentation as well as persuasion – and written as 
well as oral discourse. So a Stoic seems to have thought that he should use 
the same sort of language when he is giving a proof and when he is giving a 
speech. No wonder it was boring! (2) One of the Stoic virtues of language is 
unconventional, as least when applied to rhetoric, namely conciseness. And 
the Stoics seem to have emphasized this virtue. Not only should an orator be 
concise in the preamble, so as to get to the point quickly, and in the conclusion, 
so as not to make the audience impatient; no, the entire speech should be as 
concise as possible. This means, in plain English, that an orator should say 
no more than he needs to say in order to convey information: there should 
be no elaborations, no unnecessary examples, just a clear statement of the 
information that the audience needs to have in order to make a good decision. 
The reason for this ideal is simple: manipulation should be avoided. I will 
come back to that, but it is now time to try and get a better grasp of what a 
‘Stoic speech’ may have been like. We will then be better able to understand 
how this conciseness was expressed in practice.
 An attempt at reconstructing a ‘Stoic speech’ 
We have seen that Cicero had a notion of ‘Stoic orators’. But what sort of 
speeches did they give? In other words, what was a ‘Stoic speech’ like? How 
was it constructed? Neither Cicero nor, as far as I know, anybody else gives 
examples of Stoic speeches. But I think we can imagine how a Stoic would 
have spoken if we look more closely at some well-known Stoic proofs. Take 
Cleanthes’ proof that the soul is corporeal, for example:
No incorporeal interacts with a body, and no body with an incorporeal, but one body interacts 
with another body. Now the soul interacts with the body when it is sick and being cut, and 
the body with the soul; thus when the soul feels shame and fear the body turns red and pale 
respectively. Therefore the soul is a body.9 (Nemesius, De natura hominis 78, 7–79, 2)
9 Trans. Long and Sedley 1987.
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I suggest that, given the brief analysis of Stoic rhetoric above, we can detect 
the rhetorical elements in this proof if we reconstruct it as a Socratic dialogue 
along the following lines:
– Wouldn’t you agree that no incorporeal entity can interact with a body?
– I would.
– And that no body interacts with an incorporeal entity?
– That, too. 
– Rather, what interacts is one body with another body. Isn’t that so?
– Yes.
– Now, doesn’t the soul interact with the body when the body is sick and being cut? 
– It does. 
– And likewise the body with the soul?
– Maybe. 
– Isn’t it the case that when the soul feels shame and fear, the body turns red and pale 
respectively?
– Granted. 
– So you must concede that the soul is a body.
This is a row of yes-or-no ‘pin-prick’ question that together make up a 
continuous discourse, a line of thought. But who is supposed to answer the 
questions? It depends, perhaps, on the size of the audience. If the audience 
is fairly large – say, 10 to 15 people – then each person would perhaps be 
expected to speak to himself, as it were, without saying anything out loud. But 
if the audience was very small – say, 2 or 3 people – then maybe one or two 
of them could have answered aloud. It is these small audiences, these closed 
circles, that the Stoics were mainly interested in, or so I have suggested. 
Note that this would virtually obliterate the distinction between rhetoric and 
dialectics, speaking and teaching, giving a lecture and holding a seminar. That 
is what I meant at the outset when I said that Stoic rhetoric was aimed at 
making students good lobbyists. Note also that if this is what a ‘Stoic speech’ 
was like, then we can understand why it was so boring. In fact I think it is fair 
to say that the outcome is neither a piece of good thinking nor an example of 
good rhetoric; but it may have made good seminars, as the many examples in 
Epictetus testify.
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Why	the	early	Stoics	were	so	critical	of	conventional	rhetoric
Julia Annas seems to think that the Stoics’ reason for being against conventional 
rhetoric was that, in their view, it is required of agents that their actions spring 
from the right sort of motive, not superficially or shiftily.10 Annas even seems 
to think that a Stoic agent must act with the right sort of motives in a rather 
Kantian sense, which I believe is partly right, but partly wrong. It is wrong 
if it is taken to mean that, according to the Stoics, one cannot perform one’s 
task (one’s kathēkon, officium) without having a perfect moral insight, which, 
after all, is the prerogative of the wise man alone. But it is right that, according 
to the Stoics, acting from superficial and shifty motives is bad for the agents 
themselves – one should live with constancy (‘constanter’) – and also for 
other people in one’s environment, since the behaviour of a shifty person is 
hard to predict and such a person cannot be trusted. So I believe Annas is quite 
right to suggest that the Stoics were against conventional rhetoric, because the 
aim of such rhetoric is to influence people in such a way that they change their 
minds for no good reason.
Another way of putting this would be to say that the Stoics were against 
conventional rhetoric because, in their view, we should never be governed by 
our emotions. But we should be careful not to understand this in the wrong 
way. It is true that according to the Stoics we ought to avoid irrational emotions 
such as fear, hope, enthusiasm, erotic desire, and so on. We also ought to avoid 
using language in ways that manipulate other people’s emotional lives, even 
in situations where we may achieve worthwhile results by doing so. (We could 
lie, but that is a different story.) Irrational emotions should be avoided for the 
reasons I have mentioned: since they are shifty, they ruin the constancy of 
our lives. But it is important to realize that not all our emotions are irrational, 
according to the Stoics. There are reasonable emotions, for instance joy, 
caution, care, and benevolence. According to the Stoics, we may well be 
governed by them. We may even use language to influence such emotional 
reactions in others: a speech may create benevolence towards the speaker, 
caution against an upcoming danger, and so on. What we should not do is 
use language in such a way that the audience feels enthusiasm rather than 
benevolence, fear rather than caution, and so on. In short, as orators we should 
not appeal to other people’s emotions but to their reason.
10 See n. 9 in Annas 2001, 92.
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